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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
GREENLIFE ENERGY SOLUTIONS, LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
MCCORMACK, BARON, SALAZAR, INC., 
MBS-INTEGRAL UCNI, LLC, SCHOLARS 
LANDING MBS MEMBER, INC., VINCE 
BENNETT, KEVIN MCCORMACK, TONY 
SALAZAR, RICHARD BARON, HILLARY 
ZIMMERMAN, and MICHAEL DUFFY, 
Defendants. 
CIVIL ACTION NO. 
2018CV307344 
Business Case Div. 3 
ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS 
The above styled action is before the Court on: (1) Defendants MBS-Integral UCNI, LLC 
and Scholars Landing MBS Member, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss, filed on September 12, 2018; 
(2) Individual Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed on September 12, 2018; and (3) Defendant 
McCormack Baron Salazar, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss, filed on September 12, 2018. Having 
considered the pleadings and argument of counsel at a February 1, 2019 hearing in this matter, 
this Court finds as follows: 
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS 
According to the Complaint, Plaintiff GreenLife Energy Solutions, LLC ("GreenLife") 
"is a commercial development, general construction and engineering firm based out of Atlanta, 
Georgia that performs projects primarily in the City of Atlanta and Southeastern United States."1 
Complaint, ill3. 
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Keven Patterson ("Patterson") "is the sole and managing member of GreenLife."2 
Defendant McCormack, Baron, Salazar, Inc. ("MBS") is based out of Missouri and "is 
part of a broader umbrella of McCormack Baron companies [ collectively the "MBS Entities"], 
which comprise the nation's leading for-profit developer, manager and asset manager of 
economically-integrated urban neighbors." Plaintiff alleges "[a] key business development 
strategy of the MBS Entities .. .is to identify and select a local co-development partner in the 
firm's target markets.?" Further, "[i]n markets that have significant African-American 
populations, African-American leadership and minority participation goals, the MBS 
Entities ... developed a strategic model to identify successful African-American-led local firms to 
partner with."5 The individually named Defendants-Vince Bennett ("Bennett"), Kevin 
McCormack ("McCormack"), Tony Salazar ("Salazar"), Richard Baron ("Baron"), Hillary 
Zimmerman ("Zimmerman") and Michael Duffy ("Duffy")-are officers and directors of MBS.6 
MBS's Vice President of Business Development, Ronald Roberts ("Robert"), and others 
at MBS allegedly "had known Patterson for years and had been involved in other projects with 
[him] in the Southeastern United States.t" In August of 2014, Roberts contacted GreenLife about 
exploring opportunities in Atlanta.8 Plaintiff alleges "[MBS] was exploring a working 
relationship with GreenLife because Patterson and GreenLife fit the demographic profile within 
[MBS 's] strategies, are familiar with the Atlanta market, have local relationships in the Atlanta 
market, and understand the types of opportunities that would be logical targets for [MBS] in the 
2 
Complaint, i[l4. 
Complaint, i11s. 
Complaint, ,r20. 
Complaint, i]53. The individually named Defendants are referred to collectively herein as the "Individual 
Defendants" or as the "Misrepresentation Defendants" where referred to as such in the Complaint. 
7 Complaint, ,r,r 16-17. 
8 Complaint, ,r16. 
4 
6 
2 
Atlanta [mjarket.T' 
During the remainder of 2014 and into 2015, MBS and GreenLife allegedly met on 
numerous occasions "to both establish a list of potential targets and to outline potential terms of a 
broader relationship.v'" For example, in October of 2014, they jointly submitted a proposal on an 
affordable housing project in Atlanta called Renaissance at Park Place South and met with 
another developer to discuss the redevelopment of an apartment home project in Atlanta called 
Conley Village. 11 During this period, MBS also conducted a credit check and a background 
check "to, among other things, confirm GreenLife's and Patterson's financials."12 
From November of 2014 through February of 2015, GreenLife and MBS engaged in 
numerous discussions to formalize their relationship through a written agreement. 13 During this 
time, Defendants McCormack, Bennett, Salazar, and Baron allegedly "became activity involved 
in [MBS's] negotiations with GreenLife."14 Plaintiff alleges Patterson and Roberts also "worked 
closely to create a business development strategy for the Atlanta market", and Patterson "began 
increasing marketing efforts and informing centers of influence in the Atlanta [m]arket of the 
proposed co-development partnership with [MBS]."15 
On January 21, 2015, the parties executed a Letter of Understanding ("LOU"). 16 
Although the LOU expressly states that it is non-binding, 17 its purpose was "to reach an 
9 Complaint, iJ2 l. 
Complaint, ii 24. 
Complaint, ilil 25-26. 
Complaint, ilil 27, 29, 32. 
Complaint, ii 32. 
Complaint, ii 33. 
Complaint, ilil 34-35. 
Complaint, ,i 37, Ex. F (Letter of Understanding regarding Joint Venture Co-Development Opportunity). 
The LOU attached to the Complaint as Exhibit Fis not executed and has a "DRAFT" watermark. 
17 See LOU at p. 5 ("The purpose of this LOU is to generally describe a Joint Venture Co-Development 
Agreement MBS is taking under consideration. This LOU is not a commitment to invest, form a co-developer entity, 
nor a commitment to be bound by the terms proposed herein, and no such commitment will exist prior to the 
negotiation and execution of a mutually satisfactory Joint Venture Co-Development Agreement. Except with respect 
to confidentiality provisions herein, it is expressly understood and the parties explicitly agree that this LOU does not 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
3 
understanding on the relationship, terms and conditions under which MBS and [GreenLife] agree 
to partner to finance, acquire, close, construct and operate proposed developments located in 
[sic] throughout the Atlanta (Georgia) metropolitan area."18 That same month MBS and 
GreenLife "were invited to attend a January 26, 2015 meeting with the City of Atlanta about 
serving as the housing lead for a $30 million Choice Neighborhood[s] Implementation ("CNI") 
Grant for the Choice Neighborhood[s] Projects."!" 
"The sites that were to be redeveloped in connection with the Choice Neighborhood[s] 
Projects included: (a) affordable housing, which is being implemented as the University 
Commons Off-Site Multifamily; (b) single family townhomes; ( c) renovation of a building called 
Roosevelt Hall; and ( d) commercial and retail space. "20 The City of Atlanta and the Atlanta 
Housing Authority ("AHA") are co-applicants on the CNI Grant, a grant from the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") which typically requires the development of three 
distinct strategies and plans-Housing Strategy, Neighborhood Strategy, and People Strategy- 
with each strategy having a designated entity serving as the "lead."21 The City of Atlanta 
ultimately approved, awarded and allocated funding for all of the Choice Neighborhoods 
Projects.22 
Green Life alleges Patterson, Roberts, and Bennett attended the January 26, 2015 meeting 
"with an understanding that they were pursuing opportunities together and would be partners on 
any opportunities obtained at the meeting."23 At the conclusion of that meeting, MBS and 
GreenLife were allegedly invited to serve together as lead of the Housing Implementation 
create a legally binding agreement as to any of the Parties"). 
18 LOU at p. 1. 
19 Complaint, ,i 38. 
2° Complaint, ,i 39. 
21 Complaint, ii 40. For example, the leader for the Housing Strategy is referred to as the Housing 
Implementation Entity. Id. 
22 Complaint, ,i 50. 
23 Complaint, ,i 42. 
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Entity.24 GreenLife claims that "[i]mmediately after the meeting, GreenLife and [MBS] 
confirmed their understanding that any opportunity that arose from the meeting would be 
pursued jointly by [MBS] and GreenLife ... "25 Although prior to the meeting, the City and AHA 
had been in discussions with an Atlanta firm called The Integral Group ("Integral") to serve as 
the Housing Implementation Lead and MBS "was reluctant to consider serving as Housing 
Implementation Lead at the expense of Integral," MBS eventually agreed to have Integral "serve 
as a smaller participant in the Choice Neighborhood[s] Projects.T'" 
However, according to GreenLife, Defendant MBS and the Individual Defendants27 
ultimately "sought to both use GreenLife to secure the Choice Neighborhood[s] Projects, and to 
simultaneously defraud and cheat GreenLife out of the benefits of them."28 Specifically, 
GreenLife alleges that while the Individual Defendants continued to formalize [MBS's] 
relationship with GreenLife, on February 2, 2015 they also caused MBS to form a new 
affiliate-Defendant Scholars Landing MBS Member, Inc. ("Scholars Landing MBS")-to enter 
into a "side deal" with Integral related to the Choice Neighborhoods Projects ("Side Deal").29 On 
February 3, 2015, Integral Development, LLC and Scholars Landing MBS executed an operating 
agreement for Defendant MBS-Integral UCNI, LLC ("MBS-Integral"), a company that "was 
established for the purpose of implementing the Housing Component as the Housing 
Implementation Entity" related to the City of Atlanta and AHA's Choice Neighborhoods grant 
application.i" 
24 Complaint, ,i 45. 
Complaint, ii 46. 
Complaint, i1,i 47, 49. 
In its Complaint, GreenLife refers to these particular Defendants as the "Misrepresentation Defendants." Id. 
at ,i 53. See note 6, supra. 
28 Complaint, ,i 53. 
29 Complaint, ,iii 54-55, Ex. I (Scholars Landing MBS Articles of Incorporation and Missouri Certificate of 
Incorporation). 
3° Complaint, ii 55, Ex. H (Operating Agreement ofMBS-Integral UCNI, LLC) at pp. 1-2. 
25 
26 
27 
5 
Unaware of the Side Deal, on February 5, 2015, Patterson met with MBS and the 
Individual Defendants at MBS's offices in St. Louis, Missouri "to finalize the terms of what 
would become the Joint Development Agreement ("JOA") between [MBS] and GreenLife."31 
Nevertheless, the next day on February 6, 2015, Integral Development, LLC and MBS-Integral 
executed a "letter agreement" referencing the collaboration of Integral Development, LLC and 
Scholars Landing MBS (as members of MBS-Integral) "with respect to the redevelopment 
activities described in the Atlanta FYI [sic] 2014 Choice Neighborhoods Implementation Grant 
application. "32 
Finally, GreenLife alleges that on February 11, 2015 it was fraudulently induced to enter 
into the JOA with MBS, an agreement containing multiple obligations that would apply to 
"projects" which term GreenLife contends included the Choice Neighborhoods Projects.33 
GreenLife claims the JOA, thus, includes in its terms multiple misrepresentations insofar as 
MBS 's obligations under its prior Side Deal with Integral "prevented it from complying with the 
terms of the [JOA]" as both documents purport to govern the Choice Neighborhoods Projects.34 
GreenLife asserts MBS and the Individual Defendants then caused the City of Atlanta's 
invitation to serve as Housing Implementation Lead for the Choice Neighborhood Projects to be 
extended to MBS-Integral under the Side Deal.35 MES-Integral was so identified in the new CNI 
Grant submitted to HUD, leaving GreenLife out of the Housing Implementation Lead entity. 36 
GreenLife claims it "should have been part of the ownership and control group for that entity 
under the parties' agreements" but instead Defendants' actions "have deprived GreenLife of 
31 
32 
p.l. 
33 
34 
35 
36 
Complaint, il 57. 
Complaint, 1 58, Ex. J (Letter dated February 6, 20 I 5 between MBS-Integral UCNI, LLC and Integral), at 
Complaint, il 60. 
Complaint, il161-62. 
Complaint, 167. 
Complaint, il 68. 
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participation in the Choice Neighborhoods Projects."37 
GreenLife further asserts it repeatedly asked MBS and the Individual Defendants to 
"mitigate" the harm caused to it by their actions, including requesting that they amend the MBS- 
Integral corporate documents such that GreenLife would be part of MBS-Integral.38 However, 
GreenLife alleges "[MBS] either did not comply with GreenLife's requests or was unable to 
correct the harm caused to GreenLife due to the fact that [MBS] had granted certain aspects of 
control in MBS-Integral to Integral, rather than establishing "a single purpose limited partnership 
or limited liability company" with GreenLife as set forth in the JDA.39 
On or around April 17, 2018, it was announced that the City of Atlanta and MBS had 
entered into a public-private partnership for the development and construction of the University 
Commons Off-Site Multifamily project, one of the sites which was to be redeveloped in 
connection with the Choice Neighborhoods Projects." According to GreenLife, pursuant to the 
JOA, it was to participate in that project but MBS has not honored the JOA and has purported to 
terminate the JDA.41 Further, MBS advised the City that it did not intend to proceed with the 
other awarded aspects of the Choice Neighborhoods Projects and, even though GreenLife was 
interested in completing them, due to the fact it was not part of MBS-Integral and because MBS 
terminated the JOA, "the AHA elected not to sole source the remaining Choice Neighborhoods 
Projects through GreenLife and instead will put those projects out to bid."42 GreenLife contends 
the loss of those projects is the result of "[MBS's] submission of the HUD grant application in 
the name of MBS-Integral, an entity that did not include GreenLife as a partner. "43 
37 Complaint, ilii 72-73. 
38 Complaint, iiii 75-76. 
39 Complaint, il 77. 
40 Complaint, iiii 39, 78. 
41 Complaint, ii19_ 
42 Complaint, ilii 80-81. 
43 Complaint, il82. 
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Based on the foregoing, GreenLife asserts the following claims in this action: 
(1) intentional breach of the Joint Development Agreement (against MBS)44; (2) "fraud, deceit 
and suppression't" (against all Defendantsj'"; (3) negligent misrepresentation (against all 
Defendantsj'"; (4) punitive damages (against MBS and the Individual Defendants)48; and (5) 
attorney's fees and costs (against MBS and the Individual Defendantsj'". 
ANALYSIS 
I. Standard on a Motion to Dismiss 
Defendants have moved to dismiss GreenLife's Complaint for failure to state a claim 
under O.C.G.A. §9-l l-12(b)(6) and certain Individual Defendants have also moved to dismiss 
for lack of personal jurisdiction under O.C.G.A. §9-l l-12(b)(2). 
[A] motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
may be granted should not be sustained unless (I) the allegations 
of the complaint disclose with certainty that the claimant would not 
be entitled to relief under any state of provable facts asserted in 
support thereof; and (2) the movant establishes that the claimant 
could not possibly introduce evidence within the framework of the 
complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the relief sought. If, 
within the framework of the complaint, evidence may be 
introduced which will sustain a grant of the relief sought by the 
claimant, the complaint is sufficient and a motion to dismiss 
should be denied. 
Abramyan v. State, 301 Ga. 308, 309 (2017) (citing Anderson v. Flake, 267 Ga. 498, 501 
(1997)). Further, "[ w ]hen the sufficiency of the complaint is questioned by a motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted, the rules require that it be construed 
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff with all doubts resolved in his favor even though 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
Complaint, i1ii 84-92. 
Referred to collectively herein as GreenLife's "fraud" claim. 
Complaint, ilil 93-102. 
Complaint, iiii 103-110. 
Complaint, iii] 111-117. 
Complaint, i1ii 118-120. 
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unfavorable constructions are possible." Cobb Cty. v. Jones Grp. P.L.C., 218 Ga. App. 149, 152 
(1995) (citation omitted). 
Under the notice pleading procedure of the Georgia Civil Practice Act, only "[a] short 
and plain statement of the claims" is generally required (O.C.G.A. § 9-l l-8(a)(2)(A)) although 
fraud must be pled with particularity (O.C.G.A. §9-l l-9(b)). See also Wright v. Waterberg Big 
Game Hunting Lodge Otjahewita (PTY), Ltd., 330 Ga. App. 508, 510 (2014) ("[T]he Georgia 
Civil Practice Act requires only notice pleading and, under the Act, pleadings are to be construed 
liberally and reasonably to achieve substantial justice consistent with the statutory requirement of 
the Act. Pleadings serve only the purpose of giving notice to the opposing party of the general 
nature of the contentions of the pleader, and thus general allegations are sufficient to support a 
plaintiffs claim for relief') (citing Racette v. Bank of Am., N.A., 318 Ga. App. 171, 180 (2012)). 
Nevertheless, "a complaint must give a defendant notice of the claim in terms 
sufficiently clear to enable him to frame a responsive pleading thereto." Patrick v. Verizon 
Directories Corp., 284 Ga. App. 123, 124 (2007) (citing Allen v. Bergman, 201 Ga. App. 781, 
783 (1991)). See Cleveland v. MidFirst Bank, 335 Ga. App. 465,465 (2016) ("[A] plaintiff is not 
required to plead in the complaint facts sufficient to set out each element of a cause of action so 
long as it puts the opposing party on reasonable notice of the issues that must be defended 
against"). so 
50 The Court's review on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under O.C.G.A. §9-l l-12(b)(6) is 
limited to the pleadings and the attachments thereto. See Minnifield v. Wells Fargo Bank. N.A., 331 Ga. App. 512, 
514 (2015) ("Wben considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a trial court may consider exhibits 
attached to and incorporated into the complaint and answer") (citation omitted). However, a trial court may also 
consider affidavits on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction without converting the motion to one for 
summary judgment. See Alcatraz Media, LLC, 290 Ga. App. 882, 884 (2008); Ogden Equip. Co. v. Talmadge 
Farms, 232 Ga. 614 (1974). 
9 
With respect to certain Individual Defendants' O.C.G.A. §9-l l-12(b)(2) defense, 
in Georgia, a defendant who files a motion to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction has the burden of proving lack of jurisdiction. And any 
disputes of fact in the written submissions supporting and opposing the 
motion to dismiss are resolved in favor of the party asserting the existence 
of personal jurisdiction. 
Alcatraz Media, LLC v. Yahoo! Inc., 290 Ga. App. at 883-84 (citing Aero Toy Store v. Grieves, 
279 Ga. App. 515, 524 (2006)). 
II. Analysis and Conclusions of Law 
A. Defendants MBS-Integral and Scholars Landing MBS's Motion to Dismiss 
In this action, GreenLife asserts claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation against 
MES-Integral and Scholars Landing MES. However, MES-Integral and Scholars Landing MES 
urge all such claims should be dismissed for two reasons. First, GreenLife does not allege any 
contract between GreenLife and MES-Integral or Scholars Landing MES. Second, neither MES- 
Integral nor Scholars Landing MBS are alleged to have made any misrepresentations to 
GreenLife upon which to predicate such claims. The Court agrees. 
i. Complaint fails to state a claim for fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation 
"In order to prove fraud, the plaintiff must establish five elements: (I) a false 
representation by a defendant, (2) scienter, (3) intention to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain 
from acting, (4) justifiable reliance by plaintiff, and (5) damage to plaintiff." Engelman v. 
Kessler, 340 Ga. App. 239,246 (2017) (citing Sun Nurseries, Inc. v. Lake Erma, LLC, 316 Ga. 
App. 832, 835 (2012)). "The elements of a claim for negligent misrepresentation are: (1) the 
defendant's negligent supply of false information to foreseeable persons, known or unknown; (2) 
such persons' reasonable reliance upon that false information; and (3) economic injury 
proximately resulting from such reliance." Liberty Capital, LLC v. First Chatham Bank, 338 Ga. 
10 
App. 48, 54 (2016) (citing Hardaway Co. v. Parsons, Brinckerhoff, Quade & Douglas, Inc., 267 
Ga. 424,426 (1997)). Thus, an essential element of both claims is a false representation made by 
the defendant to the plaintiff. 
Here, GreenLife does not allege MES-Integral or Scholars Landing MBS made any 
representation to GreenLife. GreenLife also fails to assert the Individual Defendants who 
allegedly made misrepresentations were acting on behalf of MES-Integral or Scholars Landing 
MBS. Although GreenLife argues MES-Integral and Scholars Landing MBS are "direct 
beneficiaries of the fraud alleged by GreenLife" and appears to argue they are "indispensable 
parties" because "GreenLife's requested relief will siphon money away from [them]"," 
GreenLife has alleged no basis in law or fact that would extend liability to MES-Integral or 
Scholars Landing MBS, which are separate legal entities from MBS. Thus, the Complaint fails to 
state fraud or negligent misrepresentation claims against MES-Integral or Scholars Landing 
MBS. 
ii. Exculpatory Provision 
MES-Integral and Scholars Landing MBS also urge the claims asserted against them are 
barred under an exculpatory provision in the JOA. 
"Absent a public policy interest, contracting parties are free to 'contract to waive 
numerous and substantial rights."' Piedmont Arbors Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. BPI Const. Co., 197 
Ga. App. 141, 141 (1990) (citing Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Stevens, 130 Ga. App. 363, 369 
(1973)). "An exculpatory clause is a contractual provision limiting or excluding remedies in 
either tort or contract (or both)." Ga. Contracts: Law and Litigation § 7:4 (2d ed. 2018).52 
51 
52 
Plaintiffs Combined Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motions for Dismissal, p. 23. 
See 2010-1 SFG Venture LLC v. Lee Ban1c & Tr. Co., 332 Ga. App. 894,897 (2015) ("Whether the clause at 
issue is characterized as a limitation-of-liability clause or an exculpatory clause is immaterial because Georgia case 
law does not appear to treat such clauses differently for purposes ofreview") (citation and punctuation omitted). 
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"Exculpatory clauses are valid and binding, and are not void as against public policy when a 
business relieves itself from its own negligence. However, exculpatory clauses do not relieve a 
party from liability for acts of gross negligence or wilful or wanton conduct." Colonial Props. 
Realty Ltd. P'ship v. Lowder Constr. Co., 256 Ga. App. 106, 112 (2002) ( citations, footnotes, 
and internal punctuation omitted). 
Wanton and wilful conduct differs from negligence. Central of Ga. R. Co. 
v. Moore, 5 Ga. App. 562, 564 (1909). It is conduct '"such as to evidence 
a wilfull intention to inflict the injury, or else was so reckless or so 
charged with indifference to the consequences ... as to justify the jury in 
finding a wantonness equivalent in spirit to actual intent" ... There is an 
element of intent, actual or imputed, in 'wilful and wanton conduct' which 
removes such conduct from the range of conduct which may be termed 
negligent. 
Martin v. Gaither, 219 Ga. App. 646, 652 (1995). '"Gross negligence' is defined as the absence 
of even slight diligence, and slight diligence is defined in [O.C.G.A. §51-1-4] as 'that degree of 
care which every man of common sense, however inattentive he may be, exercises under the 
same or similar circumstances."'Abdel-Samed v. Dailey, 294 Ga. 758, 765 (2014). 
In order to be enforceable 
[ e ]xculpatory clauses must be clear and unambiguous, they must be 
specific in what they purport to cover, and any ambiguity will be 
construed against the drafter of the instrument ... The reason why 
exculpatory clauses should be explicit, prominent, clear and unambiguous, 
is that such an agreement amounts to a waiver of substantial rights, could 
be an accord and satisfaction of possible future claims, and requires a 
meeting of the minds on the subject matter. 
Dep't of Transp. v. Arapaho Constr., Inc., 180 Ga. App. 341, 343 ( 1986), aff d, 257 Ga. 269 
(1987) ( citations omitted). 
Here, § 22 of the JOA ("Exculpatory Provision") provides: 
22. No Personal Liability. No officer, director, stockholder, member, or 
partner of either MBS or GreenLife, no disclosed or undisclosed principal 
of either MBS or GreenLife, and no person or entity in any way affiliated 
12 
with either MES or GreenLife shall have any personal liability with 
respect to this Agreement, any instrument delivered by such party in 
connection with this Agreement, or the transactions contemplated hereby, 
nor shall the property of any such person or entity be subject to 
attachment, levy, execution or other judicial process.53 
GreenLife plainly alleges throughout its pleadings that the JDA applies to the Choice 
Neighborhood Projects.54 Further, GreenLife expressly alleges that Scholars Landing MBS is "a 
newly-created affiliate of [MBS]" and the exhibits attached to the Complaint indicate Scholars 
Landing MBS and Integral Development, LLC are the members of MBS-Integral.55 Taking 
GreenLife's allegations as true for purposes of this motion, MBS-lntegral and Scholars Landing 
MBS are "affiliates" of MBS such that they are covered under the JDA's Exculpatory Provision. 
See Harkins v. CA 14th Inv'rs, Ltd., 247 Ga. App. 549, 550 (2001) ("[T]he term 'affiliate' 
'signifies a condition of being united; being in close connection, allied, associated, or attached as 
a member or branch,' and an 'affiliate company' is defined as a '[c]ompany effectively 
controlled by another company"'; holding release that extended to "affiliated and related 
companies" unambiguously released entity that, although not expressly named in the release, was 
affiliated with the defendant) (citing Black's Law Dictionary 58, 1288 (6th ed.1990)); Lovelace 
v. Figure Salon, Inc., 179 Ga. App. 51, 52 (1986) ( enforcing exculpatory clause that released the 
defendants "and/or any of their affiliated companies" from claims and demands arising out of the 
use of their services or facilities). 
As to the scope of the Exculpatory Provision, the Court notes the provision explicitly and 
prominently is titled "No Personal Liability." It unambiguously provides that certain individuals 
and entities shall not have "any personal liability" with respect to the JDA, any instrument 
delivered by such party in connection with the JDA, or the transactions contemplated thereby. 
53 
54 
55 
Complaint, ill 5, Ex. A (IDA) at§ 22 (italicized emphasis added). 
See e.g., Complaint, ,i,i 38-39, 60-67. 
Complaint, ilil 55-56, Ex. H (Operating Agreement of MES-Integral UCNI, LLC) at p. I. 
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The Exculpatory Provision is, thus, not limited to contractual claims but rather broadly 
encompasses and precludes "any personal liability," whether arising in contract or tort (short of 
willful or wanton conduct or gross negligence), related to the JOA or the transactions anticipated 
thereunder. See, e.g., Neighborhood Assistance Corp. v. Dixon, 265 Ga. App. 255, 256 (2004) 
("[A]n exculpatory clause does not need to expressly use the word "negligence" in order to bar a 
negligence claim"; holding provision agreeing not to hold the defendant or its agents 
"responsible for any losses, costs, expenses or damages that may result from [the plaintiffs] 
participation in, and/or [the defendant's] purchase and/or financing of [her] home" barred 
negligence claim); Flanigan v. Executive Office Centers, Inc., 249 Ga. App. 14, 15 (2001) 
(exculpatory clause in servicing agreement waiving "any claim for damages, direct or 
consequential, arising out of any failure to furnish any utility, service or facility, any error or 
omission with respect thereto, or any delay or interruption of the same" barred claims for breach 
of contract, negligence, tortious interference with contractual relations, and punitive damages). 
Contrast Dep't of Transp., 180 Ga. App. at 343 (termination provision allowing the Georgia 
Department of Transportation to terminate a contract if the contractor-plaintiff was prevented 
from proceeding due to a court-imposed injunction and precluding claims for losses therefrom 
could not be construed to bar breach of contract claim since the provision referred solely to 
court-imposed injunctions). Consequently, the negligent misrepresentation claim asserted against 
MBS-Integral or Scholars Landing MBS is precluded under the Exculpatory Provision. 
Given all of the above, MBS-Integral and Scholars Landing MBS's Motion to Dismiss i~ 
hereby GRANTED. 
14 
B. Individual Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
GreenLife asserts claims against the Individual Defendants for fraud, negligent 
misrepresentation, punitive damages, and attorney's fees and costs. The Individual Defendants 
urge these claims should be dismissed because the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over 
Defendants Baron, Salazar and Zimmerman and because all claims for personal liability asserted 
against the Individual Defendants are precluded under the JDA's Exculpatory Provision. 
i. Personal jurisdiction 
Under Georgia's Long Arm Statute, 
[a] court of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over any 
nonresident. .. as to a cause of action arising from any of the acts, 
omissions, ownership, use, or possession enumerated in this Code section, 
in the same manner as if he or she were a resident of this state, if in person 
or through an agent, he or she: ( 1) Transacts any business within this 
state ... 
O.C.G.A. §9-10-91(1). As noted by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Amerireach.com, LLC v. 
Walker, 290 Ga. 261 (2011): 
Nothing in subsection (1) [of O.C.G.A. §9-10-91] limits its application to 
contract cases ... ; nothing in subsection (1) requires the physical presence 
of the nonresident in Georgia or minimizes the import of a nonresident's 
intangible contacts with the State ... Although Georgia courts have 
engrafted these and other requirements onto subsection ( 1 ), such 
requirements conflict with the literal language of the statute. To be 
consistent with ... the well-established rules of statutory interpretation that 
preclude judicial construction of plain and unambiguous statutory 
language[], we must give the same literal construction to subsection (1) 
of O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 that we give to the other subsections. Accordingly, 
under that literal construction, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1) grants Georgia 
courts the unlimited authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over 
any nonresident who transacts any business in this State. Of course, 
because this statutory language would expand the personal jurisdiction of 
Georgia courts beyond that permitted by constitutional due process, we 
accordingly construe subsection (1) as reaching only "to the maximum 
extent permitted by procedural due process." 
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Id. at 265-66 (bold emphasis added) (citing Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs., LLC v. 
First Nat. Bank of Ames, 279 Ga. 672, 675-76 (2005)). 
Due process requires that individuals have "fair warning that a particular 
activity may subject them to the jurisdiction of a foreign 
sovereign." Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985). In evaluating 
whether a defendant could reasonably expect to be haled into court in a 
particular forum, courts examine [the] defendant's contacts with the state, 
focusing on whether (l) [the] defendant has done some act to avail himself 
of the law of the forum state; (2) the claim is related to those acts; and (3) 
the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable, that is, it does not violate notions 
of fair play and substantial justice. Straus v. Straus. 260 Ga. 327 
(1990); Smith v. Smith. 254 Ga. 450 (1985). These three elements do not 
constitute a due process formula, but are helpful analytical tools which 
ensure that a defendant is not forced to litigate in a jurisdiction solely as a 
result of "random," "fortuitous" or "attenuated" contacts. Burger 
King, supra at 475. The first two elements are used to determine whether 
[the] defendant has established the minimum contacts necessary for the 
exercise of jurisdiction. If a defendant has established minimum contacts, 
the court may then evaluate other factors that impact on the 
reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction, such as the burden on [the] 
defendant, the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute, [the] 
plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, the 
interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient 
resolution of controversies, and the shared interest of the states in 
furthering substantive social policies. Id. at 477. Beasley v. Beasley, 260 
Ga. 419,421 (1990). 
Stubblefield v. Stubblefield, 296 Ga. 481, 483-84 (2015). 
Importantly, although "jurisdiction over a corporate employee or officer does not 
automatically follow from jurisdiction over the corporation," "[ n ]othing in th[ e] statutory 
language [ of O.C.G.A. §9-10-91 (1 )] 'suggests that the Legislature intended to accord any special 
treatment to fiduciaries acting on behalf of a corporation or to insulate them from long-arm 
jurisdiction for acts performed in a corporate capacity."' Amerireach.com, LLC v. Walker, 290 
Ga. at 266 ( citation omitted). Indeed, "for purposes of specific personal jurisdiction, the conduct 
in which the individual employees personally and actually engage as part of their employment 
duties does count against them in spite of the fact that they engaged in the activities as 
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employees of a business entity." Isl at 267 (citation omitted). Thus, "employees of a corporation 
that is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the courts of the forum may themselves be subject to 
jurisdiction if those employees were primary participants in the activities forming the basis of 
jurisdiction over the corporation ... Personal jurisdiction over [such an employee] would extend at 
least as far as matters relating to the activities of the ... corporation[] in the forum in which he was 
a primary participant." Id. at 267-68 (citation omitted). See Kipperman v. Onex Corp., 411 B.R. 
805, 883-84 (N.D. Ga. 2009) (In order to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident 
corporate officer, "there must be a determination that the corporate officer, himself, took acts, 
such as negotiating a contract or 'enjoying substantial financial benefit' from a contract") 
( citations omitted). 
Here, GreenLife alleges Salazar, Baron, and Zimmerman are all non-residents and "upon 
information and belief are officers and directors of [MBS]."56 According to their respective 
affidavits: Salazar, a California resident, is the President of West Coast Operations for MBS57; 
Baron, a Missouri resident, is the co-founder and chairman of MBS58; and Zimmerman, a 
Missouri resident, is General Counsel for MBS59. In asserting their personal jurisdiction defense, 
Salazar, Baron, and Zimmerman each aver that: to their knowledge they have never met any 
employee or agent of GreenLife; they have never met or communicated with Keven Patterson; 
and to their knowledge, they have never communicated with an employee or agent of 
Green Life. 60 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
Complaint.j 53. 
Individual Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Ex. I (Tony Salazar Aff.) at ~13-4. 
Individual Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Ex. 2 (Richard D. Baron Aff.) at~~ 3-4. 
Individual Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Ex. 3 (Hillary Zimmerman Aff.) at ir~ 3-4. 
Tony Salazar Aff., 1~5-8; Richard D. Baron Aff., ~~ 5-8; Hillary Zimmerman Aff., 11 5-8. 
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However, GreenLife makes vanous allegations in the Complaint regarding these 
Defendants' involvement in the events giving rise to this action including, inter alia: while MBS 
was exploring a working relationship with GreenLife, Salazar and Baron made statements to the 
effect that GreenLife fit the demographic profile within MBS 's strategies and was familiar with 
the Atlanta market and logical, target opportunities"; from November of 2014 through February 
of 2015 Salazar and Baron (among others) "became actively involved in [MBS 's] negotiations 
with Greenl.ife'v'"; following the January 26, 2015 meeting with the City of Atlanta and AHA, 
these Defendants (among others) "sought to both use GreenLife to secure the Choice 
Neighborhood[s] Projects, and to simultaneously defraud and cheat GreenLife out of the benefits 
of them," causing "[MBS] to continue to formalize the relationship with GreenLife, while also 
secretly negotiating a side deal with Integral that conflicted with and prevented performance of 
the agreement that [MBS] was negotiating and eventually executed with Greenl.ife'Y'; these 
Defendants (among others) met with GreenLife's managing member, Patterson, in Missouri to 
finalize the terms of the JDA, which expressly contemplated the parties' collaboration on 
multiple real estate development projects in Atlanta, Georgia'"; and these Defendants (among 
others) knew at the time that MBS entered into the JOA that it would not honor the agreement65. 
Further, GreenLife has submitted Keven Patterson's affidavit wherein he testifies to 
various interactions with Salazar, Baron, and Zimmerman regarding GreenLife and MBS 's 
business dealings, including: a conference call on January 15, 2014 between Patterson, Roberts, 
and Baron during which they "discussed pursuing opportunities in Atlanta [sic] efforts to pursuer 
[sic] the Housing Lead on Choice" and Baron expressed "his excitement about the opportunities 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
Complaint, ,i 21. 
Complaint, ,i 33. 
Complaint, i1,i 53-54., 
Complaint, ,i 57, Ex. A (JOA) at Recital A at p. I. 
Complaint, ,i 63. 
18 
and expressed an interest in meeting with [Patterson] personally within the following few 
weeks't'"; during Patterson's visit to MBS 's offices in Missouri he "met all the key executives at 
MBS including Hillary Zimmerman" and they discussed the JOA and how the agreement related 
to the Choice Neighborhoods Projects'"; on June 1, 2015, Patterson participated in a conference 
call with Salazar and others to discuss MBS and GreenLife's debrief on the CNI in anticipation 
of a meeting with AHA68; on July 8, 2015 and July 10, 2015, Patterson participated in a 
conference call with Salazar and others to discuss moving forward with the CNI projects'"; on 
July 15, 2015, Patterson participated in a phone conference with Baron and another Defendant 
regarding the Atlanta CNI "and its potential risks and challenges='"; on July 16, 2015, Patterson 
participated in an email exchange with Baron and others "regarding the Atlanta CNI, the HUD 
application, and what occurred during the prior 5-6 months negotiations of [a] term sheet", and 
that email exchange references edits Baron made or asked to be made to documents being 
negotiated and drafted"; on July 16-17, 2015, Patterson, Baron, Salazar and others participated 
in an email exchange "regarding the Atlanta CNI executed term sheet, the AHA commitment 
letter, and commitment of the NTMCS"72. 
While Patterson's averments clearly conflict with those of Salazar, Baron, and 
Zimmerman, such disputes of fact must be resolved in GreenLife's favor as the party asserting 
the existence of personal jurisdiction. Alcatraz Media, LLC, 290 Ga. App. at 883-84; Aero Toy 
Store, 279 Ga. App. at 524. As described in the Complaint and Patterson's affidavit, Salazar, 
Baron, and Zimmerman appear to have engaged in the foregoing contacts in their capacities as 
66 Plaintiffs Combined Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motions for Dismissal, Ex. B (Keven 
Patterson Aff.) at ,i 15. 
67 Keven Patterson Aff., ,i 22. 
68 Keven Patterson Aff., ,i 27. 
69 Keven Patterson Aff., ,i,i 28-29. 
7° Keven Patterson Aff., ,i 30. 
71 Keven Patterson Aff., ,i 31. 
72 Keven Patterson Aff., ii 33. The term "NTMCS" does not appear to be defined in the pleadings. 
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officers and employees and on behalf of MBS. Moreover, although Defendants describe the 
contacts as passive-with Salazar, Baron, and/or Zimmerman simply being copied on emails or 
merely being on a conference call with numerous others-the telephone conversations as 
described by Patterson and the emails indicate ongoing and direct communications and 
negotiations with these Defendants (and others) regarding GreenLife and MBS's business 
dealings. When considered in conjunction with GreenLife's allegations and claims as well as the 
executed JDA, which expressly contemplated the companies' collaboration on multiple real 
estate development projects in the Atlanta area, the Court does not find the contacts described are 
merely "random," "fortuitous," or "attenuated." Rather, they indicate fiduciaries acting on behalf 
of a corporation to transact business in Georgia. Amerireach.com, LLC v. Walker, 290 Ga. at 
266. The Court finds it may properly exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendants Salazar, 
Baron, and Zimmerman under O.C.G.A. §9-10-91(1) and that such exercise of the Court's 
jurisdiction over these Defendants satisfies constitutional due process. 
ii. Exculpatory Provision 
As referenced above, the JDA's Exculpatory Provision states that "[n]o officer, director, 
stockholder, member, or partner of either MBS or GreenLife, [and] no disclosed or undisclosed 
principal of either MBS or GreenLife ... shall have any personal liability with respect to this 
Agreement.. .or the transactions contemplated hereby ... "73 For the same reasons summarized in 
Part II(A)(ii), supra, the Court finds the Exculpatory Provision bars the negligent 
misrepresentation claim asserted against the Individual Defendants. Accordingly, that claim is 
hereby DISMISSED. 
73 JDA, § 22. 
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However, having considered the pleadings and insofar as GreenLife alleges the 
Individual Defendants engaged in intentional misconduct and that their "omissions and 
misleading of GreenLife were willful and done with the intent of depriving GreenLife of 
contemplated benefits under the [JOA] and the parties' prior understandings,"74 the Court finds 
GreenLife has stated a claim of fraud against the Individual Defendants that is not precluded 
under the Exculpatory Provision. Further, insofar as the fraud claim survives the instant motion, 
GreenLife's derivative claims for punitive damages and attorney's fees and costs survive as well. 
See Racette, 318 Ga. App. at 181 ("An award of attorney fees, costs, and punitive damages is 
derivative of a plaintiffs substantive claims") (citing DaimlerChrysler Motors Co. v. Clemente, 
294 Ga. App. 38, 52 (2008)). Thus, the Individual Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED 
IN PART and DENIED IN PART as set forth above. 
C. MBS's Motion to Dismiss75 
MBS has moved to dismiss all claims asserted against it for failure to state a claim. The 
Court addresses each claim in tum. 
i. Breach of contract 
"The elements for a breach of contract claim in Georgia are the (1) breach and the (2) 
resultant damages (3) to the party who has the right to complain about the contract being 
broken." SAWS at Seven Hills, LLC v. Forestar Realty, Inc., 342 Ga. App. 780, 784 (2017) 
(citing Dewrell Sacks, LLP v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 324 Ga. App. 219,223 (2013)). 
Here, GreenLife alleges MBS breached the JOA by "failing to include GreenLife in the 
MBS-Integral entity that would become the Housing Implementation Lead" which "deprived 
74 
75 
See, e.g., Complaint,~~ 88, 89. 
In their respective Motions to Dismiss, MBS-Integral and Scholars Landing MBS and the Individual 
Defendants adopt in full the arguments made in MBS's Motion to Dismiss. Thus, the Court's rulings regarding 
MBS's motion also apply to the other Defendants. 
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[GreenLife] of an ownership interest, participation in, and control of the entity that would 
become the Housing Implementation Lead on the Choice Neighborhood[s] Projects" and 
ultimately deprived it of the opportunity to participate in those projects.76 
As to the scope of the JOA and the projects contemplated thereunder, the agreement 
provides in part: 
A. MBS and GreenLife desire to collaborate on multiple real estate 
development projects in the Metropolitan Statistical Area of Atlanta, 
but not on an exclusive basis. The real estate projects will consist of: (i) 
affordable and workforce tax credit multifamily residential housing 
projects, (ii) non tax credit residential housing projects; [sic] (iii) general 
commercial and retail developments with and without secured parking, 
(iv), [sic] and other types of projects (individually a "Project", and 
collectively the "Projects"). 
B. The parties hereto are entering into this Agreement in order to 
document the agreement between the parties to various terms and 
conditions regarding the development of the Projects, in an effort to, 
among other things, coordinate joint development of the Projects, 
minimize potential conflicts, delays and performance risks, agree on cost- 
sharing procedures, protect the Parties against delays and additional costs 
that arise from a Party's failure to carry out its obligations and/or fund its 
portion of the Projects. 
C. The Parties further contemplate that for each Project to be 
developed in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, the Parties 
will enter into a Project Specific Owner's Agreement (each, an 
"Owner's Agreement") to further set forth the Project specific terms 
and conditions of the collaborative development of such Project by the 
Parties. The Parties acknowledge that each Owner's Agreement will 
include provisions which shall supplement the provisions [sic] this 
Agreement and further agree that the terms and conditions of the Owner's 
Agreements shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the terms and 
conditions of this Agreement, provided that to the extent the terms of each 
Owner's Agreement is inconsistent with this Agreement, the term of each 
Owner's Agreement shall control with respect to such inconsistency.f 
The JOA goes on to outline various terms that will govern the parties' rights and 
obligations with respect to the development of projects including, inter alia: the coordination, 
76 
77 
Complaint, i1,i 86-89. 
JDA, Recitals iii! A-Cat p. I (bold emphasis added). 
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performance, and funding of pre-development work; a structure for the ownership of projects 
depending on whether it is a "tax credit project" or a "non-tax credit project"; the selection of 
project architects, contractors and other consultants; the parties' development responsibilities; 
and the split of project developer fees. The JOA also has a "No Modification" provision that 
states: "This Agreement represents all of the agreements between the Parties with respect to the 
subject matter hereof as of the date of this Agreement, and no alteration or modification shall be 
binding unless in writing and signed by both Parties." 
MBS asserts the breach of contract claim is subject to dismissal because the JOA does 
not require that it make GreenLife a Housing Implementation Lead on the Choice 
Neighborhoods Projects and it expressly states that the parties' agreement is not "exclusive." 
Further, the JDA does not identify any particular project and instead contemplates that for "each 
Project to be developed in accordance with the terms of the [JOA]" the parties would execute a 
"Project Specific Owner's Agreement." Insofar as the parties did not ever agree to a Project 
Specific Owner's Agreement with respect to the Choice Neighborhoods Projects, MBS asserts 
any alleged failure to involve GreenLife in the Choice Neighborhoods Projects cannot constitute 
a breach of the JDA. 
Nevertheless, GreenLife's pleadings include the affidavit of Roberts, a former MBS 
employee directly involved in the negotiations between GreenLife and MBS regarding the JOA 
and their dealings concerning the Choice Neighborhoods Projects. Roberts avers the parties 
executed the JOA and jointly pursued the Choice Neighborhoods Projects with an understanding 
that they would collaborate together on those opportunities.78 Moreover, with its Complaint 
GreenLife submitted a term sheet dated July 27, 2015 that is executed by "MBS" and "Integral" 
which relates to the "Choice Neighborhood activities" and "their collective role as Housing 
78 Amendment to Complaint, Ex. P (Ronald Roberts Aff.) at i1,i 24-30. 
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Implementation Entity" and expressly provides that the "Roles" of MBS as described therein 
"will be carried out by a Joint Venture of McCormack Baron and GreenLife."79 
Thus, whether the parties held themselves out as a joint venture with respect to the 
Choice Neighborhoods Projects or came to an agreement with respect to same such as to fall 
within the JDA cannot be determined from the pleadings. Construing the pleadings in the light 
most favorable to GreenLife and resolving all doubts in its favor, the Court cannot say that the 
pleadings disclose with certainty that GreenLife would not be entitled to relief under any state of 
provable facts or that GreenLife could not possibly introduce evidence within the framework of 
the Complaint sufficient to warrant relief for breach of contract. See Cobb Cty., 218 Ga. App. at 
152; Abramyan, 301 Ga. at 309; Anderson, 267 Ga. at 501. Thus, MBS's Motion to Dismiss is 
DENIED with respect to the breach of contract claim. 
ii. Fraud 
As noted above, in order to state a claim for fraud, the plaintiff must establish five 
elements: (1) a false representation by a defendant, (2) scienter, (3) intention to induce the 
plaintiff to act or refrain from acting, ( 4) justifiable reliance by plaintiff, and (5) damage to 
plaintiff. Engelman, 340 Ga. App. at 246; Sun Nurseries, Inc., 316 Ga. App. at 835. 
GreenLife alleges MBS intentionally made false representations before and after 
execution of the JOA that it would honor the JOA and that the parties would pursue the Choice 
Neighborhoods Projects together. GreenLife alleges these false representations caused GreenLife 
to enter the JDA and assist Defendants in securing the Choice Neighborhoods Projects although 
MBS ultimately secured those projects for MBS-Integral and MBS's affiliate, Scholars Landing 
MBS. GreenLife further alleges that, as a result of Defendants' false representations, it forewent 
opportunities to pursue the Choice Neighborhoods Projects with other potential partners and it 
1? Complaint, Ex. L (MES/Integral Term Sheet dated July 27, 2015) at p. 3. 
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ultimately was not able to participate in those projects at all. The Court finds GreenLife has 
stated a claim for fraud. 
MBS urges the economic loss rule bars GreenLife's tort claims. 
The "economic loss rule" generally provides that a contracting party who 
suffers purely economic losses must seek his remedy in contract and not in 
tort. Under the economic loss rule, a plaintiff can recover in tort only those 
economic losses resulting from injury to his person or damage to his 
property. 
General Elec. Co. v. Lowe's Home Centers, Inc., 279 Ga. 77, 78 (2005) (citations and footnotes 
omitted). Nevertheless, 
[t]wo exceptions exist to this general rule: (1) the accident exception, 
which allows a plaintiff to recover in tort when there is a sudden and 
calamitous event that not only causes damage to the product but poses an 
unreasonable risk of injury to persons and other property, [Vulcan 
Materials Co. v. Driltech, 251 Ga. 383, 388 (1983)]; and (2) the 
misrepresentation exception, which was defined by our Supreme Court as 
follows: "[O]ne who supplies information during the course of his 
business, profession, employment, or in any transaction in which he has a 
pecuniary interest has a duty of reasonable care and competence to parties 
who rely upon the information in circumstances in which the maker was 
manifestly aware of the use to which the information was to be put and 
intended that it be so used. This liability is limited to a foreseeable person 
or limited class of persons for whom the information was intended, either 
directly or indirectly." Robert & Co. Assoc. v. Rhodes-Haverty 
Partnership. 250 Ga. 680, 681-682 (1983). In setting forth the second 
exception our Supreme Court "'approved the Restatement of Torts 2d, § 
552 (1977) which sets forth essentially the same five elements to recover 
as are required for fraud."' American Legion v. Foote & Davies, Inc., 193 
Ga. App. 225, 228 (1989) (quoting Guernsey Petroleum Corp. v. Data 
Gen. Corp., 183 Ga. App. 790, 795 (1987)). 
Advanced Drainage Sys., Inc. v. Lowman, 210 Ga. App. 731, 734 (1993). See Home Depot 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Wabash Nat. Corp .. 314 Ga. App. 360, 366 (2012) (noting fraud and 
misrepresentations clams fell under misrepresentation exception to the economic loss rule). 
In light of the false representations allegedly made by Defendants prior to and following 
the negotiation and execution of the JDA and with respect to the parties' joint pursuit of the 
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Choice Neighborhoods Projects, the Court finds this action falls within the misrepresentation 
exception such that GreenLife's tort claims are not barred by the economic loss rule. 
MBS also asserts no basis exists to impute or attribute false statements allegedly made by 
the "Misrepresentation Defendant" to MBS. However, O.C.G.A. §51-2-2 provides: "Every 
person shall be liable for torts committed by ... his servant by his command or in the prosecution 
and within the scope of his business, whether the same are committed by negligence or 
voluntarily." See King v. Citizens Bank of DeKalb, 88 Ga. App. 40, 45 (1953) ("[I]n order to 
hold the defendant corporation liable for the act of its officer, such tort must have been 
committed during the prosecution of the business of the corporation as a part thereof or by 
authority of the corporation or be ratified by it or assented to"). See also O.C.G.A. §51-2-l(a) 
("For the negligence of one person to be properly imputable to another, the one to whom it is 
imputed must stand in such a relation or privity to the negligent person as to create the 
relation of principal and agent") ( emphasis added); O.C.G.A. §51-2-4 {"An employer 
generally is not responsible for torts committed by his employee when the employee exercises an 
independent business and in it is not subject to the immediate direction and control of the 
employer") ( emphasis added). 
Here, GreenLife alleges the Individual Defendants "upon information belief are officers 
and directors of [MBS]."80 The pleadings plainly indicate the actions taken by the Individual 
Defendants were taken in their capacities as officers and directors of MBS and in the scope of 
their employment. Construing the pleadings in the light most favorable to GreenLife, GreenLife 
has sufficiently alleged a basis to attribute the allegedly false representations made by the 
Individual Defendants to MBS. 
80 Complaint, il53. 
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MBS also alleges GreenLife's fraudulent inducement claim fails as a matter of law 
because GreenLife must make an election of remedies and it has affirmed the JDA and never 
rescinded it. 
Where one is induced to enter into a contract by fraud, the defrauded party 
has an election either to affirm the contract and sue for damage resulting 
from the fraud or rescind the contract.. .One can pursue any number of 
inconsistent remedies prior to [the] formulation and entry of 
judgment ... Thus, [a plaintiff] [i]s not required to elect [its] remedy prior 
to the submission of [its] case to the jury but would have to do so if 
inconsistent verdicts had been rendered. 
Tankersley v. Barker, 286 Ga. App. 788, 790-91 (2007) ( citing Long v. Marion. 182 Ga. App. 
361,366 (1987)). See Black & White Const. Co. v. Bolden Contractors, Inc., 187 Ga. App. 805, 
808 (1988). Thus, GreenLife's assertion of a breach of contract claim and a fraud claim 
simultaneously does not require dismissal of the fraud claim as a matter of law at this juncture. 
Additionally, MBS argues the fraudulent inducement claim fails because the "No 
Modification" provision in the JOA is a merger clause which acts as a disclaimer of all 
representations made prior to its execution. However, insofar as GreenLife alleges Defendants 
made misrepresentations in the JDA itself and following its execution, the "No Modification" 
provision does not bar GreenLife's fraud claim as a matter of law. See Authentic Architectural 
Millworks, Inc. v. SCM Grp. USA, Inc., 262 Ga. App. 826, 828 (2003) (fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation claims based on representations made in contract not barred by alleged merger 
clause). 
MBS also asserts the fraud claim fails because the alleged false representations upon 
which it is premised are future promises which cannot support fraud. 
[T]he general rule is that actionable fraud cannot be predicated upon 
promises to perform some act in the future .... An exception to the general 
rule exists where a promise as to future events is made with a present 
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intent not to perform or where the promisor knows that the future event 
will not take place. 
Jonas v. Jonas, 280 Ga. App. 155, 159-60 (2006). Accord JTH Tax, Inc. v. Flowers, 302 Ga. 
App. 719, 725 (2010). 
Here, GreenLife plainly asserts MBS negotiated the JDA with an understanding the 
parties would pursue the Choice Neighborhood Projects as partners while knowing it would not 
pursue those projects with GreenLife as its partner. GreenLife alleges MBS had engaged in the 
Side Deal with Integral and formed MES-Integral to serve as the Housing Implementation Entity 
for the CNI Grant housing component. Insofar as GreenLife alleges MBS made promises and 
representations with respect to future events with no present intent to perform them or knowing 
that such performance would not occur,81 GreenLife's fraud claim falls under the exception to 
the general rule that actionable fraud cannot be based on promises as to future events. 
Finally, MBS asserts the fraud claim has not been pied with sufficient particularity as 
required under O.C.G.A. §9-11-9(b ). That code section provides in relevant part: "In all 
averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstance constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with 
particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred 
generally." See Diversified Holding Corp. v. Clayton McLendon, Inc., 120 Ga. App. 455, 456 
( 1969) ("[T]he circumstances constituting the fraud must be stated with particularity. At the very 
least the pleader should designate the occasions on which affirmative misstatements were made 
and by whom and in what way they were acted upon"). "However, the proper remedy for seeking 
more particularity is by motion for a more definite statement at the pleading stage or by the rules 
of discovery thereafter." Pampattiwar v. Hinson, 326 Ga. App. 163, 170 n.3 (2014) (citing Odom 
v. Hughes. 293 Ga. 447,455 n. 6 (2013)). 
81 Complaint, 1il 54, 94-95. 
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MBS has not moved for a more definite statement. Further, GreenLife amended the 
Complaint to include the affidavit of Ronald Roberts and submitted Keven Patterson's affidavit. 
Both of these affidavits provide additional specificity with respect to GreenLife's claims. For 
these reasons, the Court finds GreenLife has sufficiently stated its fraud claim and further 
development of same is best left for discovery. Given the foregoing, MBS's Motion to Dismiss 
GreenLife's fraud claim is DENIED. 
iii. Negligent misrepresentation 
"The elements of a claim for negligent misrepresentation are: (1) the defendant's 
negligent supply of false information to foreseeable persons, known or unknown; (2) such 
persons' reasonable reliance upon that false information; and (3) economic injury proximately 
resulting from such reliance." Liberty Capital, LLC, 338 Ga. App. at 54; Hardaway Co., 267 Ga. 
at 426. 
MBS alleges the Complaint does not identify what information MBS supplied to 
GreenLife or how MBS did so negligently. However, as noted above, in the Complaint 
GreenLife alleges MBS and the Individual Defendants used GreenLife to secure the Choice 
Neighborhood Projects and entered the JDA with the understanding the parties would jointly 
pursue those projects while at the same time negotiating the Side Deal with Integral. 82 GreenLife 
asserts "[t]he very deal that [it] brought to [MBS], and that would be covered by the [JDA] 
between GreenLife and [MBS], was the same deal that the Misrepresentation Defendants [i.e. the 
Individual Defendants] moved over to Integral under the Secret Side Deal."83 
With respect to the negligent misrepresentation claim, GreenLife incorporates its prior 
allegations and further alleges that at the time MBS and the Individual Defendants made false 
82 
83 
Complaint, ilil 53-56. 
Complaint, 159. 
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representations to GreenLife they knew or should have known the misrepresentations were false 
and that their actions would prevent MBS from performing its obligations under the JDA. 
GreenLife asserts it relied on the misrepresentations by entering into the JDA, assisting MBS in 
securing the Choice Neighborhoods Projects, and forgoing opportunities to pursue those projects 
with other potential partners. Further, GreenLife alleges it suffered damages as a result of its 
reliance on the Defendants' misrepresentations, including not being able to participate in the 
Choice Neighborhoods Projects. Although MBS asserts GreenLife has failed to identify any out 
of pocket damages it suffered to support its negligent misrepresentation claim, such does not 
mandate the dismissal of the claim at the pleading stage. The Court finds GreenLife has stated a 
claim for negligent misrepresentation and MBS is adequately on notice of same. See Wright , 
330 Ga. App. at 510 ("[G]eneral allegations are sufficient to support a plaintiffs claim for 
relief'). Thus, MBS 's Motion to Dismiss GreenLife's negligent misrepresentation claim is 
hereby DENIED. 
iv. Punitive damages and attorney's fees and costs 
In light of the Court's rulings above and insofar as tort claims remain for adjudication, 
GreenLife's claims for punitive damages and attorney's fees and costs also survive the instant 
motion. See Racette , 318 Ga. App. at 181; DaimlerChrysler Motors Co., 294 Ga. App. at 52. 
CONCLUSION 
Given all of the above, the Court rules as follows: Defendants MBS-Integral and Scholars 
Landing MBS 's Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED and those Defendants are dismissed 
from this action; the Individual Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and 
DENIED IN PART as set forth above; and Defendant MBS's Motion to Dismiss is hereby 
DENIED. 
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SO ORDERED this tf day of February, 2019. 
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